lmost every 2016 flagship mobile phone, whether Android-or iOS-based, is set to come with an integrated fingerprint reader. The benefits of fingerprint readers are clear to users, but is the underlying technology really ready for widespread adoption? This article explores some of the background of the challenge of secure user authentication on mobile devices, as well as recent weaknesses identified in the handling of fingerprints on many consumer devices. It also considers legislative and social implications of the widespread adoption of fingerprint authentication. Finally, it attempts to look forward to some resulting problems we may encounter in the future.
Fingerprint readers are, without doubt, one of the must-have features on almost every smartphone being launched in 2016. The Samsung Galaxy range of flagship devices has featured a fingerprint reader since the Note 4 and S5. Sony's latest Z5 range includes a fingerprint reader on each device. Indeed, even newer entrants to the market, such as OnePlus, are including a fingerprint reader on their handsets. Smartphone fingerprint readers are used typically to implement biometric authentication. Biometric authentication is, as the name suggests, a means of authenticating a user based on making measurements of one or more physical characteristics-in this case, the person's fingerprint. Fingerprint authentication on computers is not a new concept, having previously been seen on ThinkPads and other enterprise laptops and even on some high-end personal digital assistants. A more detailed history of the use of biometrics and fingerprints was given by Corcoran in 2013 [1] . As fingerprint readers have become increasingly commonplace in smartphones, particularly following
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IEDs on the Road to Fingerprint Authentication
Biometrics have vulnerabilities that PINs and passwords don't.
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A the introduction of Touch ID on the iPhone 5s, there has been time for the dust to have settled on some implementations and for security researchers to have investigated their inner workings.
USER ATTITUDES AND THE DEMAND FOR CONVENIENCE
The premise for fingerprint authentication on mobile devices is typically as a replacement for the password or PIN. Good passwords require users to follow a multitude of rules, ensuring the length, complexity, and uniqueness of every password they use. Remembering unique passwords for an ever-increasing number of services places a significant demand upon users and leads to more easily guessable or reused passwords. Users now carry out 50% of their password entry operations on smartphones, where special characters are difficult to type and long passwords are inconvenient [2] .
A key selling point of biometric authentication is that it allows users to move away from passwords, both for use in authenticating to third parties and for unlocking their own physical device. This eliminates the requirement to enter passwords and avoids the inconvenience of forgetting passwords.
There are clear indications from previous studies that users are aware of and willing to use biometrics. In their 2005 survey, Clarke and Furnell found that 83% of surveyed mobile phone users would be willing to use biometric authentication [3] . Indeed, of those aware of the existence of fingerprint authentication, 99% were happy to use it. This is in clear contrast with iris recognition, where only 70% of those who were aware of it were happy to use it.
In contrast, an earlier survey from 2000 [4] , which focused more generally on authentication rather than specifically on mobile phone authentication, found that 67% of surveyed users were willing to use fingerprint authentication. While this would indicate that either user attitudes toward fingerprint authentication have changed with time or that users consider mobile authentication a special case, a 2007 study on the uses of authentication technologies [5] found that only around 40% of users surveyed agreed that biometrics were useful when accessing a computer, in contrast with 66.1% when considering financial transactions.
It is worth noting that these surveys were carried out prior to the recent widespread adoption of smartphones. Nonetheless, it is clear that users are willing to use fingerprint authentication. Moreover, the increased portability of smartphones, combined with the large quantities of personal data stored within, is potentially a driver for the uptake of the technology. Harbach et al. showed that the perceived inconvenience of a secure lockscreen on a smartphone was a factor in around one-third of people not enabling one, and with an average of 48 unlocks per day, there is a clear argument for convenience in unlocking frequently used devices like smartphones [6] .
AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Fingerprints, and biometrics in general, present users with a simple alternative to PINs or passwords, to which they are accustomed. We believe fingerprint authentication is viewed more favorably than alternatives due in part to the user perception that biometrics are the most secure form of authentication [5] . In particular, we believe that users feel that fingerprints are secure in part due to their relative uniqueness and due to their use in criminal justice. This does, however, raise an important distinction when considering the use of fingerprints-that is, that the needs of an identification system are somewhat different than those of an authentication system.
In a biometric identification system, the goal is to reliably ascertain who an individual is, based upon a comparison of measurements taken from a sample, which are then matched against previous measurements. For this to work correctly, each individual in a population should be uniquely defined and should be recognizable in the future against a previous measurement. Therefore, there is considerable focus on the uniqueness of the characteristics. For example, in a criminal investigation, the aim of forensic fingerprint analysis is to recover the fingerprints of individuals who may have been present at a crime scene. Biometric identification is then carried out to ascertain if these recovered fingerprints match those recovered from any other crime scenes or from individuals known to have previously committed crimes.
In contrast, a biometric authentication system is designed to allow an individual asserting his or her identity to prove this assertion, based upon the ability to provide biometric measurements in keeping with previously enrolled values. In the authentication scenario, a rapid result and a low false-positive rate are desirable. One consideration is that a strong authentication process, per the definition of the European Central Bank, is required to be nonreusable and nonreplicable. This is to prevent reuse of a previously valid authentication session that may have been observed. There is, however, an exception made for authentication based on biometric factors, since it is inherently based on static measurements of a person. The distinction between identification and authentication is also discussed in [1] .
LIMITATIONS OF FINGERPRINTS IN AUTHENTICATION
STATIC AND UNCHANGEABLE
The fundamental limitation of fingerprint-based authentication is that our fingerprints are the ones we were born with and the ones we keep for life. They are, by virtue of Users now carry out 50% of their password entry operations on smartphones, where special characters are difficult to type and long passwords are inconvenient.
being part of us, unchangeable. This is an advantage in one sense, as a user cannot "forget" personal fingerprints in the same way an infrequently used password can be forgotten over time. For many users, the convenience of not forgetting passwords is a significant draw of fingerprint authentication.
IRREVOCABLE IDENTIFIERS
By virtue of being static in nature, there is no effective means of revocation. If your fingerprints are compromised by some means, there is no way you can prevent the compromised copies from being reused in the future. This is a limitation of the process of fingerprint authentication, since ultimately the verifier is expecting to see the same fingerprint on each occasion. Breaches of fingerprint data are now no longer a hypothetical situation, given the recent theft of 5.6 million U.S. federal government employees' fingerprints from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) [7] .
EASILY OBSERVED AND CAPTURED
Fingerprints are also easily captured without the subject being aware, both with and without physical contact. As highlighted in 2013 following the highly publicized "breaking" of Apple's new Touch ID feature, a latent fingerprint was captured using a high-resolution photograph of the glass touchscreen of an iPhone. It was then used to create a mold that could form an artificial fingerprint capable of unlocking the phone [8] . While a relatively complicated process, this highlights one fundamental risk of relying on fingerprint authentication on smartphones-they are held and touched by the user in daily operation, and their large glass surfaces acts as a magnet for the user's fingerprints.
Additionally, it was recently shown that fingerprints can also be captured without physical contact. A series of highresolution photos, including one from a press release, was used to recreate the fingerprints of the German defense minister [9] . Indeed, this is not the first occasion in which a German politician's fingerprints have been publicized; in 2008, an index fingerprint was obtained and reproduced from a water glass used by the German interior minister during an event at a university, resulting in over 4,000 copies being reproduced on plastic foil capable of being used on various fingerprint readers [10] .
THEY CAN'T BE TURNED OFF
Another property of fingerprints is that they are static and cannot easily be "turned off." As you go about your life, you are leaving a trail of fingerprints. With the rise of fingerprint authentication, this could be considered tantamount to leaving a trail of sticky notes containing your username and password to every account you have, every time you touch something.
If a password is compromised or becomes known to someone else, it is relatively straightforward to change it, therefore revoking it, with the biggest inconvenience merely being memorizing a new password. This isn't possible with fingerprints, since they remain constant at all times. Our inability to effectively control where our fingerprints are left behind is a significant concern. You can be careful to type your bank password only in the privacy of your own home, on a system with no keyloggers, with the curtains closed to foil onlookers, but if you use a fingerprint to authenticate with your bank (either directly or indirectly), you cannot avoid leaving those fingerprints around. There is no concept of security level with fingerprints in the same way that one can use a single low-security "throwaway" password for uninteresting accounts that don't contain any personal data of value.
LIMITATIONS OF FINGERPRINT SENSING
Smartphone fingerprint sensors have been subject to a variety of high-profile attacks, where fake fingerprints made from a variety of materials designed to have properties similar to human skin have been accepted as valid fingerprints. Indeed, these techniques are not out of the practical reach of private individuals [8] .
More fundamentally, a fingerprint sensor within a computer system is typically designed to convey a measurement of an individual's raw fingerprint to another component of the computer system that is responsible for either deriving a cryptographic key or unlocking an existing cryptographic key held securely on the device [1] . Therefore, by identifying the input format expected by the key storage or computation module, it is possible to present a falsified (or previously captured) fingerprint reading "on the wire," thus bypassing the need to create a fake physical fingerprint.
LEGISLATIVE CONCERNS
FINGERPRINTING IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In most countries of the world, those accused of crimes are presumed innocent until they are convicted in a court of law. In many jurisdictions, however, those who are under arrestthough not charged with or convicted of any offense-may be required to provide their fingerprints, which can be held on a database for the purpose of identifying any linked crimes for which an individual may be responsible [11] .
This process, by definition, involves capturing a record of an individual's fingerprints. Since fingerprints are static and irrevocable, the individual's fingerprints are now potentially on file indefinitely. If fingerprints are used as a secure means of authentication, this is equivalent to a person being required
With an average of 48 unlocks per day, there is a clear argument for convenience in unlocking frequently used devices like smartphones.
to hand over a full list of all past, present, and future passwords, simply as a part of the investigative process.
While there may be legal procedures through which exonerated individuals can appeal to have their records removed, it will never be possible for a person to be sure that his or her fingerprints no longer reside on a database somewhere. The same applies to those traveling to a country that stores fingerprint records of those entering as a matter of routine, such as the United States under the OBIM program (formerly US-VISIT) [12] . Large databases are not impenetrable to unauthorized access, as was shown in the OPM breach mentioned above.
Fingerprints may also be handled differently from a legal perspective than something that is known to a person, such as a password or PIN. In the U.S. state of Virginia, a judge found that requiring the disclosure of a password or PIN would be in breach of the Fifth Amendment, but that requiring a person suspected of committing a crime to use his or her fingerprint to unlock a device was constitutional [13] . It highlights an interesting situation on some devices, such as the iPhone, where a fingerprint can be used only within 48 hours of the last successful fingerprint login, after which the PIN must be used.
CURRENT IMPLEMENTATIONS
SMARTPHONE IMPLEMENTATION
Today's consumer devices featuring fingerprint authentication technology typically make use of the ARM TrustZone Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which allows for isolated "secure world" code to be executed on the regular CPU, separate from untrusted user code such as that of a mobile device's operating system.
Recent research by Zhang et al. has nonetheless highlighted the problem of poor implementational security of fingerprint readers on many mobile devices. In their paper, a number of security issues with implementations of fingerprint sensors in mainstream phones were identified [14] . In the most extreme case of the HTC One MAX, the user's enrolled fingerprint was stored in a world-readable file. This meant that any unprivileged application running on the phone could read the file containing a user's fingerprint, without the user being aware.
While the established best practice for implementation of fingerprint readers involves the use of the ARM TrustZone to hold, validate, and handle all fingerprint data, Zhang et al. highlighted that even with this in place there have been exploits against TrustZone, and that the fingerprint reader device is often exposed to the regular, non-TrustZone operating system of the mobile phone. This allows the fingerprint reader to be accessed by software running on the phone, provided it is able to elevate its privileges sufficiently to do so.
In addition, there have been numerous publicly documented exploits of TrustZone technology [15]- [17] . All of these allowed for arbitrary code execution within the secure environment, and the latter specifically gives a proof of concept to show how the user's raw fingerprint can be captured and retrieved from the reader, despite only code running in the TrustZone being able to read from the fingerprint reader on the device in question.
READER TRUST
Another, more general, consideration with today's implementation of fingerprint authentication is that of trust of the capture device. Since, by definition, fingerprint data are constant, it is necessary for the reader or capture device to be trustworthy and not store or transmit them for use or storage by unauthorized parties. This raises the questions of who is authorized to receive the data, how the biometric data may be used, and the manner in which they may be stored and processed. Specifically, when a device such as a smartphone holds biometric data, the question arises over whether the company that manufactures the smartphone has, or should have, any right (or ability) to access those data. In the case of Android devices, for example, there is also the question of whether or not Google (the developer of the core operating system) has the ability or right to access the data.
A rise in the use of fingerprint authentication on smartphones would also likely fuel a rise in the use of fingerprint authentication in other areas. For example, since 2010, Poland has installed bank ATMs featuring fingerprint authentication, where a fingerprint is used in conjunction with a PIN to withdraw cash [18] . Significantly, this requires users to provide their fingerprints to an unverifiable device operated by a third party. Fake ATMs-or real ones with unauthorized modifications-have been a popular way for criminals to "skim" cards and obtain PINs via fake keypads and card readers.
If users become comfortable with providing their fingerprints to equipment requesting it without being familiar with it (to identify signs of tampering or illegitimacy), they may find their fingerprint data stolen by criminals. While the same is completely true of bank card numbers and PINs as used presently at ATMs, there is little long-term impact of such details being compromised. The bank freezes the account, reverses the transactions, and issues a new card to the account holder, who sets a new PIN. But in the case of biometric authentication, it is not possible to change or revoke the biometric.
In 2008, an index fingerprint was obtained and reproduced from a water glass used by the German interior minister, resulting in over 4,000 copies being reproduced on plastic foil capable of being used on various fingerprint readers.
OTHER USES
Biometric data are potentially of huge value to advertisers and other businesses, as they allow for theoretically globally unique identification of users, simply based upon their use of a product or service. If fingerprint readers become a common feature of consumer electronic devices such as smartphones, undoubtedly questions over the rights to the use of such data will emerge and need to be answered.
Whether it is legal, ethical, or acceptable for fingerprint data to be used to pervasively track a user is a question that should be answered before such technology becomes widespread. Otherwise we may find ourselves in a situation such as we face with Internet-based services, where users have relatively limited technical controls and restrictions over the use and sharing of their personal data, and websites carry out widespread tracking of user activity and actions across the wider Internet.
The ability for an advertiser to tell with certainty that a current visitor to a website, or a user of an application, is the same one as in a previous browsing session would be of incredible value to the advertiser. This ability would persist across devices and browsing sessions. It would also be effective against attempts to prevent such tracking, such as a user clearing a device's cookies. While the suggestion not to provide fingerprints to such websites may well be the obvious one, ensuring that this is enforced with technical (rather than legislative) measures is essential. But with current fingerprint reader implementations-generally "black box" systems not open to scrutiny by researchers or experts-this is difficult to achieve.
ACTION VERIFICATION
In contrast to a PIN or password, where a user is prompted to enter a particular one for a given service or action, fingerprints remain constant between services. This means that it is critical that the user carefully verifies the action about to be carried out, before approving the request for the fingerprint. Since the same fingerprint may be used both to unlock a device and to authorize a high-value bank transfer, it is important to ensure that users have a reliable and trustworthy way to understand the operation they are approving via their fingerprint.
Entering a PIN requires a user to understand the action being authorized. Assuming that a user follows good practice and doesn't have the same PIN on all bank cards, the person can easily detect that he or she is carrying out a transaction on the wrong card due to the PIN being rejected. Likewise, while not foolproof against malicious attack [19] , the screen on an EMV chip-and-PIN payment terminal confirms the value of a transaction being carried out, or the recipient and value of a transfer. But on a smartphone featuring fingerprint authentication, simply providing a fingerprint is sufficient to carry out a variety of operations. These can extend from merely unlocking the device, to logging in to an app or website, to initiating a bank transfer. Indeed, smartphone apps from major banks now allow the use of fingerprints to authenticate transactions [20] .
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
AVOIDING THE READER
With the rise in smartphone fingerprint sensors, it is interesting to note that, while early devices with such sensors (such as the Motorola Atrix) featured their sensor on the rear of the device, where it could be avoided or covered by a case, more recent implementations (such as the iPhone and Samsung's Galaxy range of devices) feature the fingerprint reader on the front, within the device's physical home button. This presents usability benefits for consumers, since authentication can be carried out using a button they already use for other tasks. Additionally, for the purpose of unlocking the device, the same button used to wake the phone can be immediately used as a fingerprint reader to verify the user's fingerprint. On the other hand, this also makes it easier for a user to unintentionally authenticate a request, simply through overfamiliarity with the process.
Continuing this trend, it is conceivable that in the future, the need for a fingerprint reader in itself may be eliminated, given a recent patent application by Apple [21] that includes a fingerprint reader within the screen. At that point-and arguably also today, with the reader a component of one of the major buttons on the phone-the question arises as to whether or not a user has a choice to be fingerprinted while using a device. While users can avoid using the reader for the purpose of authentication, it is much more difficult with the current "black box"-style fingerprint authentication systems to verify that the fingerprint data aren't being read or stored. With sensors embedded in screens, it may not be clear to users when they are authenticating a request, since the authentication process may no longer be a clear, distinct action, thus bypassing the careful consideration that should be taken before proceeding.
FINGERPRINT PAYMENTS
The latest consumer application of fingerprint-based authentication on smartphones, and potentially one of the most visible, is for the authentication of payments carried If fingerprint readers become a common feature of consumer electronic devices such as smartphones, undoubtedly questions over rights to the use of such data will emerge and need to be answered.
out via a mobile device. By placing the smartphone against a contactless reader, a user is able to select the card to use for payment and then authenticate the payment by simply placing a finger against the smartphone's fingerprint reader.
Early implementations that we see on today's consumer devices, such as Apple Pay, appear to have a number of weaknesses, as exhibited in their own demonstration. Specifically, there is no authentication of the transaction amount visible. As seen in their product demonstration, an Apple Pay user simply knows that he or she is being asked to approve a transaction with the selected card, but there is no indication of the value of the transaction being carried out [22] .
Taking into consideration the design of smartphonebased payment systems, which are now deployed and operational in the United States and United Kingdom, we believe there is a risk of early users becoming victims of fraud, given the reliance of these systems on fingerprint authentication. Even putting aside the limitations of fingerprints being unchangeable and potentially known to third parties, and the ease with which they can be captured, a fingerprint reader is ultimately used to authenticate to a "trusted" area of the smartphone, often based on ARM TrustZone technology, as discussed previously.
If the contents of this TrustZone were to be compromised, the user's fingerprint would most likely no longer be necessary to authorize transactions on behalf of a user. The presentation of a permitted fingerprint is used by the semiisolated TEE to permit the use of cryptographic keys, which are themselves only accessible by the TEE. In the event of the TEE being compromised (as discussed earlier), these keys could be exfiltrated from the device or otherwise abused by a malicious user (such as by forcibly enrolling a new fingerprint).
POTENTIAL MITIGATIONS
Despite many of the potential risks and challenges of the use of fingerprints in secure authentication, it is clear that consumers feel it is secure enough. Products incorporating fingerprint readers are now reaching the market in significant quantities. In this section, we consider some ways in which these risks can potentially be mitigated or reduced to allow for a practical solution to the clear user demand for a simpler means of authentication.
LEGISLATION
First, we believe that strong legislation is necessary to govern how biometric information may be used and shared. Where such legislation exists, it often covers only government or official use of biometric information [23], rather than commercial or third-party use and gathering of biometric information.
When users voluntarily provide their fingerprints to a piece of consumer electronic equipment, they are no longer engaging with a legislated entity. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, the handling of electronic or personal data (which may include biometric data) is left to self-regulation and loose oversight rather than legislation [24] .
Given the unique way in which biometric information cannot be changed, we believe that legislation governing the technological protection of biometric data is necessary to ensure that consumer technology utilizing it is designed to reduce the risk of compromise as much as possible.
TRANSPARENT IMPLEMENTATIONS
To mitigate many of the risks of current implementations (such as TrustZone exploits and the like), we believe it would be advisable for implementations of biometric authentication to be designed and documented publicly, with all relevant source code as to the operation of the authentication mechanism made available for public review. With fingerprint authentication set to become near ubiquitous in the short term, there would be considerable benefit to ensuring that the technology is secure, on account of the doubts people have over the use of biometric authentication and the significance end users place on trust and resistance to attack [25] . Ensuring that implementations are transparent and open to independent scrutiny would facilitate verification of correct implementation, as well as identification of security weaknesses. While it could be argued that such disclosure would make attacks easier, a lack of source code has A key selling point of biometric authentication is that it allows users to move away from passwords, both for use in authenticating to third parties and for unlocking their own physical device.
not held researchers back from finding vulnerabilities in TrustZone and other fingerprint reader implementations, as discussed earlier.
TRUSTED SOFTWARE
If a product offers a consistent and predictable user interface for the request of fingerprint authentication, it is important to ensure that this interface is trustworthy. For example, it is critical that the application or service requesting identifying information is clearly and correctly identified to the user to thwart social engineering attacks and to prevent falsely generated prompts from overriding the system prompt to change the appearance of the prompt (making it appear that a different application is requesting authentication).
We also recommend that at each opportunity the user be clearly presented with a summary of the action being carried out at each point (using a trusted software implementation, which is again open to scrutiny and security testing by independent researchers). A separate cryptographic key should be used for each application using biometric authentication to prevent a rogue application from generating a valid authentication message in response to its own request, which would be accepted by another service as an attestation that the user had agreed to an operation. This would be a risk in a scenario where a service accepted a signed random value as an attestation. Another application could request the same random value and replay the token, unless a unique key is used for every application.
AVOIDING OVERUSE
One factor we have identified is that the overuse of fingerprint authentication may well pose a risk. Consumers seek convenience, and the convenience of fingerprint authentication is attractive compared with the task of typing lengthy passwords on a small on-screen keyboard. Despite this, repetitive authentications result in people becoming lazy, as is seen in their use of short or simple passwords that they are asked for regularly. If fingerprint authentication is overused, we believe it's likely that people may become overly comfortable with simply approving everything that is requested, rather than validating the precise request. Especially when a fingerprint reader is located on the home key of a product, the natural reaction will be to approve the action, rather than to scrutinize it further and verify that it is indeed the action that should be carried out. Encouraging users to pause and consider the request, perhaps even enforcing this via a short onscreen time-out, would go some way to ensuring that users are aware of the action for which they are providing authentication.
AWARENESS OF RISKS
It is important for service and application implementers to be aware of the risks of fingerprint authentication, particularly around those whose fingerprints may be known to third parties or have been captured by them. While today's payment solutions allow fingerprint authentication as a means of proof that the cardholder is present, this ultimately relies on the integrity of the TrustZone implementation used to hold the user's cryptographic keys, which are unlocked and used to authenticate the transaction to the card issuer. If these keys were extracted or a manmade fingerprint was presented to the reader, the proof that a customer was present to authorize a transaction could be faked. Moreover, with the ease with which an unwilling party can be compelled to give his or her fingerprints, it is also likely that people may be forced to unlock fingerprint-authenticated equipment against their will to authorize transactions or simply for their fingerprints to be captured for future use.
PLAN FOR COMPROMISE
Finally, in light of the previous point, it is necessary to begin to plan for a future where fingerprint and other biometric authentication is readily subverted by malicious use of, or threat of, force. While the same is true for today's passwords and PINs, we are always capable of selecting and using new ones. Early adopters of biometric authentication technologies will be at risk of emerging threats, and we should be prepared for a time where people's fingerprints are widely known. For this reason, it is important to consider this risk when deploying biometric technology in the future, and for companies relying on it to be aware that the presence of a seemingly biometrically verified signature does not necessarily indicate that the user has agreed or given consent. This may also have implications for the legal status of biometrically authenticated signatures.
CONCLUSION
Biometric user authentication, in the form of fingerprint authentication, is becoming increasingly mainstream, seen on almost all present or upcoming flagship mobile handsets. Despite the wide reach of fingerprint authentication, we have highlighted a number of concerns around its fundamental security. The permanent, irrevocable nature of fingerprints means that their compromise or capture is a lifelong concern. We also leave fingerprints behind on almost everything we touch, including specifically the screens of the products we use in our day-to-day lives.
Researchers have shown the ease with which a fingerprint Breaches of fingerprint data are now no longer a hypothetical situation, given the recent theft of 5.6 million U.S. federal government employees' fingerprints from the Office of Personnel Management.
can be cloned from photographs or simply from a glass touched by an individual.
We also explored the risks of implementations of today's fingerprint authentication technology, specifically surrounding some of the risks of TrustZone-based implementations of key storage and fingerprint verification, and exploits that have previously allowed for arbitrary code execution, compromising the supposedly secure execution environment. We have also explored the risk of improper implementation of fingerprint readers in commercially available smartphones, including those that expose fingerprint data to any app running on the phone.
Fingerprint authentication looks set to continue to grow, despite the warnings of the security industry. While consumers are drawn by the convenience it offers-the ability to replace passwords with something faster and unforgettable-they need to be clear on the caveat that it can also never be changed. The next few years will likely dictate how biometric authentication will work in the future. Could we end up in a position where muggers simply take fingerprints of their victims, knowing they now hold users' keys for life? We have made a series of recommendations toward improving the technical implementation of biometric security on current consumer devices and enhancing trust of their software, although these will not address some of the fundamental concerns over the static nature of biometric identifiers and their use in authentication.
